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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jeramey Storm Anderson appeals from his conviction for possession of
methamphetamine.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Officers pulled Anderson over for having a broken brake light and failing to make
a proper stop at a stop light. (Trial Tr., p. 115, L. 3 – p. 116, L. 4; p. 124, L. 7 – p. 136, L.
5; p. 141, Ls. 3-5; p. 249, L. 4 – p. 250, L. 22.) One of the two officers saw a syringe in
plain sight in the vehicle’s glove box as Anderson rummaged for papers. (Trial Tr., p. 136,
Ls. 13-16; p. 250, Ls. 4-17.) An officer found a glass tube of a sort associated with
methamphetamine use in Anderson’s pocket. (Trial Tr., p. 137, L. 13 – p. 138, L. 3; p.
162, Ls. 9-20.) Officers searched Anderson’s car and found the syringe, two syringe caps,
and a safe. (Trial Tr., p. 138, L. 4 – p. 139, L. 22.) A drug dog alerted on the safe. (Trial
Tr., p. 188, Ls. 3-15.) Inside the safe officers found a digital scale and the end of an
aluminum can that had heroin and methamphetamine residue on it. (Trial Tr., p. 152, Ls.
17-24; p. 162, L. 21 – p. 163, L. 22; p. 163, L. 23 – p. 164, L. 9; p. 214, L. 14 – p. 216, L.
24.) Officers also found a chewed-up baggie of methamphetamine near Anderson’s clothes
on the floor of the room where Anderson changed into jail garb during the booking process.
(Trial Tr., p. 194, L. 8 – p. 197, L. 24; p. 217, L. 14 – p. 218, L. 23; p. 230, L. 6 – p. 241,
L. 7.) The next day Anderson made three calls from the jail. (Trial Tr., p. 281, L. 8 – p.
284, L. 4.) In those calls he stated that he had “eat[en]” “a lot” of methamphetamine and
gotten sick. (State’s Exhibits 7-9.)
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The state charged Anderson with possession of heroin, possession of
methamphetamine, introduction of methamphetamine to a correctional facility, and
possession of paraphernalia. (R., pp. 74-75, 120-21.) The case proceeded to trial. (R., pp.
139-50.) At the trial Anderson testified that when the officers attempted to stop him he
“ate some drugs that I had.” (Trial Tr., p. 297, L. 13 – p. 298, L. 2.) He also admitted the
substance he possessed was “meth” and that he knew it was methamphetamine. (Trial Tr.,
p. 304, Ls. 9-21.) The jury convicted Anderson of possession of methamphetamine and
possession of paraphernalia (R., pp. 187-88), but hung on the possession of heroin and
introduction charges, which were mistried (R., pp. 149-50). The district court entered
judgment, sentencing Anderson to seven years with two years determinate for the
possession of methamphetamine and credit for time served for the possession of
paraphernalia. (R., pp. 200-02.) Anderson filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 20405.)
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ISSUES
Anderson states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the State present sufficient evidence to support Mr. Anderson’s
conviction for possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine)?

II.

Did the State commit prosecutorial misconduct by contending in
closing arguments that the jury could convict Mr. Anderson for
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) based on
the uncharged conduct of consuming methamphetamine?

III.

Did the district court err when it did not give a unanimity instruction
for the charge of possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine), because the jury was faced with two distinct
acts of possession?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 9.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Anderson failed to show that the evidence at trial, including his testimony that
he knowingly possessed methamphetamine, was insufficient evidence to support his
conviction for possession of methamphetamine?
2.
Has Anderson failed to show fundamental error in the prosecutor’s argument that
Anderson’s trial testimony he knowingly possessed methamphetamine was evidence that
Anderson was guilty of the possession of methamphetamine charge?
3.
Anderson argues that not giving an unrequested special unanimity instruction
requiring the jury to unanimously decide what evidence it was relying on to convict him of
possession of methamphetamine was fundamental error. Is his argument meritless?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
Anderson Has Failed To Show That The Evidence At Trial, Including His Testimony
That He Knowingly Possessed Methamphetamine, Was Insufficient Evidence To Support
His Conviction For Possession Of Methamphetamine
A.

Introduction
The state charged Anderson with possession of a controlled substance because he

“on or about the 31st day of December, 2016, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did
unlawfully possess a controlled substance, to-wit: Methamphetamine, a Schedule II
controlled substance.” (R., p. 121.) The state presented evidence that when officers
encountered him Anderson possessed methamphetamine residue on a can bottom used as
paraphernalia and methamphetamine in a baggie; and that he ate most of the
methamphetamine in the baggie, which baggie ended up on the floor of the room where
Anderson changed into jail clothing. (Trial Tr., p. 152, Ls. 17-24; p. 162, L. 21 – p. 164,
L. 9; p. 194, L. 8 – p. 197, L. 24; p. 214, L. 14 – p. 216, L. 24; p. 217, L. 14 – p. 218, L.
23; p. 230, L. 6 – p. 241, L. 7; State’s Exhibits 7-9.) Anderson testified that he ate
methamphetamine when officers were stopping him, in order to avoid being caught with
it. (Trial Tr., p. 297, L. 13 – p. 298, L. 2; p. 304, Ls. 9-21.)
On appeal Anderson argues this evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s
guilty verdict for possession of methamphetamine. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-19.) Even a
cursory review of the evidence presented at trial refutes this argument.

B.

Standard Of Review
“In assessing the sufficiency of evidence, we will uphold a judgment of conviction

entered upon a jury verdict so long as there is substantial evidence upon which a rational
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trier of fact could conclude that the prosecution proved all essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jones, 154 Idaho 412, 417, 299 P.3d 219, 224 (2013)
(internal quotation omitted).

The Court “must view the evidence in the light most

favorable” to upholding the jury verdict and will not substitute its own judgment on issues
of weight, credibility or reasonable inferences. Id. The Court reviews “all of the trial
evidence, including the evidence offered by the defendant.” State v. Cortez, 135 Idaho
561, 563, 21 P.3d 498, 500 (Ct. App. 2001).

C.

The Evidence Overwhelmingly Supports The Jury’s Verdict
Where a criminal defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting

his conviction on appeal, the “relevant inquiry is not whether this Court would find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Eliasen, 158 Idaho
542, 546, 348 P.3d 157, 161 (2015) (emphasis original). See also State v. Young, 138
Idaho 370, 372, 64 P.3d 296, 298 (2002) (evidence is sufficient if “any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt”); State v.
Daniels, 134 Idaho 896, 898, 11 P.3d 1114, 1116 (2000) (verdict reviewed for substantial
evidence upon which “any rational trier of fact” could have found guilt (internal quotations
omitted)). If there are multiple possible bases for supporting a general verdict “the inquiry
on appeal becomes whether there was sufficient evidence to uphold any one of the bases
of conviction.” Cortez, 135 Idaho at 564, 21 P.3d at 501. In reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence, “this Court will construe all of the evidence in favor of upholding the
verdict.” State v. Glass, 139 Idaho 815, 818, 87 P.3d 302, 305 (Ct. App. 2003).
5

Considering all the evidence as required, Anderson’s conviction is more than amply
supported. Police found methamphetamine residue on a can bottom in a safe in Anderson’s
car, jailors found methamphetamine in a baggie (which had apparently been in Anderson’s
mouth) by his clothes where he was changing into jail garb, Anderson admitted in
monitored phone calls that he had eaten drugs that made him sick, and he testified under
oath that he possessed methamphetamine that he ate at the time police initiated contact.
(Trial Tr., p. 152, Ls. 17-24; p. 162, L. 21 – p. 164, L. 9; p. 194, L. 8 – p. 197, L. 24; p.
214, L. 14 – p. 216, L. 24; p. 217, L. 14 – p. 218, L. 23; p. 230, L. 6 – p. 241, L. 7; p. 297,
L. 13 – p. 298, L. 2; p. 304, Ls. 9-21; State’s Exhibits 7-9.) Application of the correct legal
standards stated in the prior paragraph leads inexorably and conclusively to Anderson’s
guilt.
Anderson’s arguments do not show otherwise. First, he argues that this Court
should ignore some of the evidence of his guilt because he believes at least one juror did
not find it persuasive. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-12.) This argument fails for at least three
reasons.
First, Anderson cites no law in support of his argument that the court should
speculate on why a jury hung on one count and on that basis ignore evidence of guilt on a
different count.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-12.)

Therefore, his legally unsupported

argument must be rejected. State v. Baxter, 163 Idaho 231, ___ n.4, 409 P.3d 811, 816 n.4
(2018) (“argument is waived if not supported by any cogent argument or authority in
opening brief” (quotations omitted)); State v. Wharton, 162 Idaho 666, 671, 402 P.3d 1119,
1124 (Ct. App. 2017) (“A party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument
is lacking.”).
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Second, Anderson’s argument is directly contrary to the applicable legal standards.
As set forth above, the standard is not whether this particular jury (or individual jurors)
found the evidence sufficient, but whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Eliasen, 158 Idaho at 546,
348 P.3d at 161 (emphasis original). See also Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 654
(2012) (“evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt” (emphasis original, internal
quotations omitted)). Moreover, the Court is required to consider all the evidence. Cortez,
135 Idaho at 563, 21 P.3d at 500; Glass, 139 Idaho at 818, 87 P.3d at 305; State v. Rivas,
129 Idaho 20, 24, 921 P.2d 197, 201 (Ct. App. 1996) (“All evidence is considered in the
light most favorable to the state.”). The Court is not required to accept the jurors’ judgment
as to the sufficiency of the evidence in relation to this count on which they convicted; nor
is it required to accept some of the jurors’ judgment as to the sufficiency of the evidence
in support of other counts. Anderson’s argument that this Court is bound by speculation
as to how some jurors viewed the evidence is directly contrary to the applicable legal
standard.
Third, Anderson’s speculations on the thinking of the juror(s) unconvinced of his
guilt on the heroin and introduction counts is directly contrary to the requirement that the
Court “view the evidence in the light most favorable” to upholding the jury verdict. Jones,
154 Idaho at 417, 299 P.3d at 224. For example, Anderson speculates that the juror(s) who
voted against convicting him for possession of heroin did so on the basis that they
concluded he did not have access to the safe. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-12.) However,
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under the requirement to “consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,”
State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 460, 272 P.3d 417, 432 (2012), this Court cannot rule
out the possibility that the juror(s) merely believed the evidence connecting him to the
methamphetamine residue on the can was stronger than the evidence connecting him to the
heroin. Likewise, Anderson speculates that the juror(s) who wished to acquit him on the
introduction of contraband to a correctional facility did so on the basis that the state failed
to prove the baggie found by his clothes after he took them off was his. (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 11-12.) Construing the evidence in favor of the State, however, the Court must
conclude that the juror(s) voting to acquit felt that Anderson had believed he had consumed
all his methamphetamine, and therefore regurgitating the bag with some methamphetamine
still inside at the jail did not amount to “knowingly” introducing the methamphetamine to
the jail. (R., p. 169 (mental state jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt to convict was
“knowingly”).) It is pointless to speculate on what the jurors wishing to acquit were
thinking, and Anderson’s invitation to do so is directly contrary to the applicable legal
standards.
Based on his counter-legal attempt to eliminate consideration of swathes of the
evidence admitted at trial, Anderson, relying on State v. Tryon, ___ Idaho ___, ___ P.3d
___, 2018 WL 1124268 (March 2, 2018), contends that only circumstantial evidence
supports the jury’s conclusion that the substance he possessed was methamphetamine, and
the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to support that finding. (Appellant’s brief, pp.
15-19.) Even if this Court were to ignore the relevant legal standards in favor of
Anderson’s standard, and consider only the direct evidence Anderson provided in his
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testimony that he knew that what he ate was methamphetamine, Anderson’s argument is
without merit.
First, as stated above, with inferences taken in favor of the state, the evidence shows
that the baggie on the jail floor next to Anderson’s clothes was the same baggie that had
held the methamphetamine he had consumed, either because he failed to entirely consume
the baggie and all of its contents or because it was otherwise regurgitated as Anderson
became sick. (See, e.g., Trial Tr., p. 331, Ls. 5-12 (prosecutor argued that the baggie in
the jail could have contained the methamphetamine Anderson admitted eating).) The
contents still remaining in that baggie were chemically tested. (Trial Tr., p. 217, L. 18 – p.
218, L. 23.) The methamphetamine Anderson ate was linked to lab testing by the evidence.
Second, even if this Court, contrary to applicable legal standards, should conclude
that there was a second baggie and State’s Exhibit 5 was not the same baggie Anderson
ate, Anderson’s argument is without merit.

Anderson testified that he ate the

methamphetamine because he knew he possessed a controlled substance, and knew that the
controlled substance he possessed was methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., p. 297, L. 13 – p.
298, L. 2; p. 304, Ls. 6-21; see also State’s Exhibits 7-9 (Anderson stating in jail calls he
ate drugs and became sick).)

His admissions were direct evidence of the nature of the

substance. State v. Sundquist, 128 Idaho 780, 781, 918 P.2d 1225, 1226 (Ct. App. 1996)
(“Direct evidence may be supplied by the defendant’s own admissions.”). See also State
v. Guinn, 114 Idaho 30, 35, 752 P.2d 632, 637 (Ct. App. 1988) (“The only direct evidence
of Guinn’s possession was his own admission of possessing less than three ounces.”) Thus,
unlike in Tryon, the state was not relying on circumstantial evidence of the nature of the
substance.
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Moreover, a great amount of evidence corroborated 1 Anderson’s admission of the
nature of the substance.

He was in possession of paraphernalia used to consume

methamphetamine (the can bottom, the glass tube and the syringe) (Trial Tr., p. 137, L. 13
– p. 139, L. 22; p. 152, Ls. 17-24; p. 162, L. 9 – p. 164, L. 9; p. 214, L. 14 – p. 216, L. 24);
he did not appear to the officers conducting the initial detention to be under the influence
(Trial Tr., p. 145, Ls. 1-4) but appeared to be extremely under the influence later that night
in the jail (Trial Tr., p. 238, L. 17 – p. 239, L. 1); and he got sick as a result of his ingestion
of the substance (State’s Exhibits 7-9). Anderson’s testimony was sufficient to establish
that the substance was in fact methamphetamine.
Anderson’s argument relies on ignoring or misapplying the relevant legal standards
and a great deal of the evidence of his guilt. He has therefore failed to show error.
Application of the correct legal standards shows that the evidence supporting Anderson’s
conviction for possession of methamphetamine is easily sufficient.

II.
Anderson Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Prosecutor’s Argument That
Anderson’s Trial Admission Was Evidence That Anderson Was Guilty Of The
Possession Of Methamphetamine Charge
A.

Introduction
The state charged Anderson with possession of a controlled substance because he

“on or about the 31st day of December, 2016, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did
unlawfully possess a controlled substance, to-wit: Methamphetamine, a Schedule II
controlled substance.” (R., p. 121.) At the trial Anderson testified that when the officers

1

Anderson has argued that the evidence was insufficient to show that he was guilty of
possession of methamphetamine found on the can bottom and the baggie, but such evidence
would still be corroborative of Anderson’s testimony.
10

attempted to stop him he “ate some drugs that I had.” (Trial Tr., p. 297, L. 13 – p. 298, L.
2.) He also admitted he “drove … away from the officers” because he knew he possessed
“meth.” (Trial Tr., p. 304, Ls. 6-14.)
Q. So you were saying that you had methamphetamine on you on December 31,
2016?
A. That is what I’m saying, sir, that I had ate and ingested before I was pulled over.
Q. Okay. And it was -- you knew it was methamphetamine?
A. Yes, I did, sir.
(Trial Tr., p. 304, Ls. 15-21.)
The prosecutor started his closing argument pointing out that Anderson “admitted
on the stand he possessed methamphetamine that night.” (Trial Tr., p. 319, L. 24 – p. 320,
L. 1.) The prosecutor argued that the admission to one of the counts was an effort to avoid
being convicted on all four counts. (Trial Tr., p. 320, Ls. 2-5; p. 326, Ls. 13-23.) When
the prosecutor argued the possession of methamphetamine count specifically he argued
that Anderson was guilty “by admission as well as the State’s evidence.” (Trial Tr., p. 327,
Ls. 18-25.)
In the defense closing argument counsel acknowledged that Anderson “admitted to
having methamphetamine earlier that night,” but contended that the state had to show he
possessed it after his arrest. (Trial Tr., p. 337, L. 24 – p. 338, L. 15.) The prosecutor
responded to this argument by stating that defense counsel was “wrong” and the
instructions do not require the jury to find that Anderson “had to possess it at the moment
the police are talking to him.” (Trial Tr., p. 342, Ls. 9-23.) Anderson cannot “get around”
his admission with that argument. (Trial Tr., p. 342, L. 23 – p. 343, L. 2.)
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On appeal, for the first time, Anderson argues that the prosecutor’s argument that
Anderson’s admission was sufficient evidence for conviction was fundamental error
because evidence that Anderson “consumed methamphetamine before the traffic stop” was
evidence of “uncharged conduct” and therefore not a “basis for … conviction.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 24.) Application of the relevant legal standards, however, shows that
Anderson was charged with all the methamphetamine he possessed, not just the
methamphetamine he failed to destroy.

Anderson’s argument that the prosecutor

improperly argued that Anderson’s testimony that he ate methamphetamine when officers
were trying to pull him over was evidence that he possessed methamphetamine on the date
in question is without merit, much less a showing of fundamental error.

B.

Standard Of Review
“On appeal, the standard of review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct

depends on whether the defendant objected to the misconduct at trial.” State v. Severson,
147 Idaho 694, 715, 215 P.3d 414, 435 (2009). If a defendant fails to timely object at trial
to allegedly improper closing arguments by the prosecutor, the conviction will be set aside
for prosecutorial misconduct only upon a showing by the defendant that the alleged
misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228, 245
P.3d 961, 980 (2010); State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. p.
2010). Review without objection will not lie unless (1) the defendant demonstrates that
“one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights were violated”; (2) the
constitutional error is “clear or obvious” on the record, “without the need for any additional
information” including information “as to whether the failure to object was a tactical
decision”; and (3) the “defendant must demonstrate that the error affected the defendant’s
12

substantial rights,” generally by showing a reasonable probability that the error “affected
the outcome of the trial court proceedings.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.
“The existence of an impermissible variance is a question of law over which we
exercise free review.” State v. Ormesher, 154 Idaho 221, 223, 296 P.3d 427, 429 (Ct. App.
2012).

C.

Anderson’s Argument That The Prosecutor Committed Fundamental Error By
Advocating For His Conviction On Uncharged Conduct Is Unsupported By The
Law Or The Record
“A prosecutor is permitted to discuss the evidence and the inferences and the

deductions arising therefrom.” State v. Hall, 163 Idaho 744, ___, 419 P.3d 1042, 1072
(2018). When arguing the evidence and the inferences therefrom, “both parties are given
wide latitude in making their arguments to the jury.” State v. Folk, 162 Idaho 620, 633,
402 P.3d 1073, 1086 (2017). Anderson testified, without limitation, that he possessed
methamphetamine when officers first tried to stop him, but ate it before pulling over in
order to avoid getting caught with it. (Trial Tr., p. 297, L. 13 – p. 298, L. 2; p. 304, L. 6 –
p. 305, L. 12.) The prosecutor properly argued (Trial Tr., p. 319, L. 24 – p. 320, L. 5; p.
327, Ls. 18-25) that Anderson’s testimony was evidence that “on or about the 31st day of
December, 2016, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, [Anderson] did unlawfully possess
a controlled substance, to-wit: Methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance” (R.,
p. 121). Not only is the prosecutor’s argument not prejudicial, clear, constitutional error,
it was perfectly proper.
Anderson argues that, because of the prosecutor’s argument, he was convicted of a
crime with which he was not charged. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 23-24.) He contends “the
State had not alleged Mr. Anderson committed the crime of possession of
13

methamphetamine by consuming methamphetamine before the traffic stop.” (Appellant’s
brief, p. 23.) This argument lacks merit.
A variance may arise “where there is a difference between the allegations in the
charging instrument and the proof adduced at trial.” Ormesher, 154 Idaho at 223, 296 P.3d
at 429. “Conviction of a crime different from that charged is a denial of due process.”
State v. Brazil, 136 Idaho 327, 331, 33 P.3d 218, 222 (Ct. App. 2001). Here Anderson’s
statements, both in the recorded jail calls and in his testimony, about consuming
methamphetamine after officers initiated the traffic stop do not describe an uncharged act
of possession of methamphetamine.
“Whether a course of criminal conduct should be divided or aggregated depends on
whether or not the conduct constituted separate, distinct and independent crimes.” State v.
Major, 111 Idaho 410, 414, 725 P.2d 115, 119 (1986). In evaluating whether a course of
conduct is one or more crimes the court should consider “the circumstances of the conduct”
and “the intent and objective of the actor,” with the latter being particularly important in
regard to “crimes of possession, which involve knowledge or awareness of control over
something rather than an act or omission to act.” Id. To establish multiple offenses, there
must be “a distinct union of mens rea and actus reus separated by a discrete period of time
and circumstance from any other such similar incident” for each of the alleged acts of
possession. Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 268, 16 P.3d 937, 944 (Ct. App. 2000).
Here Anderson was charged with a single act of possession of methamphetamine
on a specific date. (R., p. 121.) On that specific date, the evidence showed, he possessed
both methamphetamine residue on a can bottom and a baggie of methamphetamine. He
attempted to eat the baggie of methamphetamine, but was only partially successful; the
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baggie and some of its contents were ultimately found regurgitated on the floor in the jail.
His argument that he was not charged with possession of the methamphetamine he
consumed (successfully or unsuccessfully) is without merit, much less a showing of clear,
constitutional and prejudicial error.
Anderson further argues that he lacked notice that the possession charge
encompassed the consumed methamphetamine. (Appellant’s brief, p. 24.) The state’s
charge, however, included all of the methamphetamine he possessed on the relevant date.
(R., p. 121.) Anderson’s argument that the notice the charge provides somehow excludes
methamphetamine that he successfully consumed between when the police lights came on
and when he submitted to the stop is certainly not supported by the language of the charge,
much less clear on the record.
Anderson instead argues that because the state did not articulate its intent to rely on
the methamphetamine he consumed to prove its charge in various points in the proceedings
it somehow misled his trial preparation. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 23-24.) He cites no law in
support of his argument that such things as the prosecutor’s opening statement or response
to a motion to suppress somehow alter or diminish the notice provided in the information.
This argument is therefore not presented for consideration. Baxter, 163 Idaho at ___ n.4,
409 P.3d at 816 n.4 (“argument is waived if not supported by any cogent argument or
authority in opening brief” (quotations omitted)); Wharton, 162 Idaho at 671, 402 P.3d at
1124 (“A party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking.”).
Moreover, it is hardly surprising the prosecutor emphasized Anderson having eaten
methamphetamine after Anderson admitted as much in his testimony. Indeed, Anderson
has failed to articulate why the state would have utilized or emphasized the jail recordings
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(which were the only evidence that Anderson ate methamphetamine available to the state
prior to Anderson’s trial testimony) in pre-trial proceedings or opening statements.
Anderson’s argument is specious: it does not show clear and prejudicial constitutional
error.
The prosecutor argued Anderson’s guilt of the charged offense of possession of
methamphetamine based on evidence admitted at trial without limitation. In doing so he
did not err, much less commit fundamental error

III.
Anderson’s Argument That Not Giving An Unrequested Special Unanimity Instruction
Was Fundamental Error Is Meritless
A.

Introduction
Anderson did not request a “special unanimity instruction” at trial. (See Trial Tr.,

p. 224, L. 11 – p. 227, L. 11.) For the first time on appeal Anderson argues that by not
giving an unrequested special unanimity instruction differentiating between “the distinct
acts of possession by consuming methamphetamine before the traffic stop, and possession
of the residue found in the safe,” the district court committed fundamental error.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 27-34.) Because as shown above, the state charged Anderson with
all the methamphetamine he possessed, his claim that the jury had to identify which of the
methamphetamine on which it was basing its conviction is meritless. Anderson was
therefore not entitled to an instruction requiring the jury to determine unanimously whether
it was convicting for “possession by consuming” or “possession of the residue” because it
was all part of the same charged act of possession.
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B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the appellate

court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88, 261 P.3d 853, 864-65
(2011) (citing State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 659, 8 P.3d 652, 654 (2000)). “An
erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible error unless the instructions as a whole
misled the jury or prejudiced a party.” State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 373-74, 247
P.3d 582, 600-01 (2010) (citing Kuhn v. Proctor, 141 Idaho 459, 462, 111 P.3d 144, 147
(2005)). Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an
alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 261 P.3d at
865; see also Perry, 150 Idaho at 227, 245 P.3d at 979. To prevail under the fundamental
error doctrine, Anderson must demonstrate that the error he alleges: “(1) violates one or
more of his unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any
additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless.” Perry,
150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.

C.

Anderson Has Not Shown Error, Much Less Fundamental Error
Jury verdicts must be unanimous. State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 375, 247

P.3d 582, 602 (2010); I.C.R. 31(a).

However, “[a]n instruction that the jury must

unanimously agree on the facts giving rise to the offense … is generally not required.”
State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 474, 272 P.3d 417, 446 (2012) (quoting State v.
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 711, 215 P.3d 414, 431 (2009)). The exception to this general
rule is when a defendant commits different criminal acts, each of which constitute “separate
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incidents involving distinct unions of mens rea and actus reas [sic].” Id. at 475, 272 P.3d
at 447.
As stated above, the relevant inquiry into the proper unit of prosecution depends on
“whether or not the conduct constituted separate, distinct and independent crimes.” Major,
111 Idaho at 414, 725 P.2d at 119. The court should consider “the circumstances of the
conduct” and “the intent and objective of the actor,” with the latter being particularly
important in regard to “crimes of possession, which involve knowledge or awareness of
control over something rather than an act or omission to act.” Id. To establish multiple
offenses, there must be “a distinct union of mens rea and actus reus separated by a discrete
period of time and circumstance from any other such similar incident” for each of the
alleged acts of possession. Miller, 135 Idaho at 268, 16 P.3d at 944. Application of this
test shows that the legislature has criminalized each separate act of possession of multiple
images of child pornography, State v. Gillespie, 155 Idaho 714, 720-21, 316 P.3d 126, 13233 (Ct. App. 2013), but made a single act of possession of stolen property a single theft
regardless of the number of victims from whom property was stolen, Brown v. State, 137
Idaho 529, 536-37, 50 P.3d 1024, 1031-32 (Ct. App. 2002).
The Idaho Court of Appeals has determined that possession of methamphetamine
in a baggie and as residue on paraphernalia at the same time in the same location is the
same crime. State v. Southwick, 158 Idaho 173, 182, 345 P.3d 232, 241 (Ct. App. 2014).
In Southwick police found a baggie of methamphetamine in the passenger-side door of the
defendant’s car and methamphetamine residue on a scale in the center between the seats.
Id. at 177, 345 P.3d at 236. On appeal Southwick contended that she was entitled to a
special unanimity instruction to determine if the jury concluded that she was guilty of
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possession of methamphetamine for the methamphetamine in the baggie or the
methamphetamine residue on the scale. Id. at 180, 345 P.3d at 239. The Idaho Court of
Appeals applied the relevant standards set forth above and concluded she was not entitled
to a special unanimity instruction. Id. at 181-82, 345 P.3d at 240-41. Because the charge
was possession of methamphetamine “on a single date, at a single time, and in a single
location” and did not “specify the means by which that possession occurred,” the record
did not show “a distinct union of mens rea and actus reus separated by a discrete period of
time or circumstance for the two alleged acts of possession.” Id. at 182, 345 P.3d at 241.
The acts of possessing the methamphetamine in the baggie and the methamphetamine on
the scale were, under the circumstances of that case, “not separate and distinct incidents of
criminal conduct.” Id.
Likewise in this case, the simultaneous possession of methamphetamine in a baggie
and methamphetamine residue on paraphernalia were not separate crimes. The state
alleged that on a specific date (“the 31st day of December, 2016”), at a certain location (“in
the County of Ada, State of Idaho”), Anderson committed an act of possession (“did
unlawfully possess”), of methamphetamine. (R., p. 121.) The relevant criminal act is
possession, I.C. § 37-2732(c), while the relevant criminal intent is “knowledge that [he] is
in possession of methamphetamine or a substance [he] believes to be a controlled
substance.” State v. Heiner, 163 Idaho 99, 408 P.3d 97, 101 (Ct. App. 2017). Anderson’s
simultaneous possession of both a baggie of methamphetamine and methamphetamine
residue on paraphernalia was the same act of possession with the same intent, not “separate
incidents involving distinct unions of mens rea and actus reas [sic].” Adamcik, 152 Idaho
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at 475, 272 P.3d at 447. Anderson was not double charged, and was therefore not entitled
to a remedy such as a special unanimity instruction.
Anderson’s argument that he was duplicitously charged with two crimes in a single
count and therefore entitled to a special unanimity instruction is meritless, much less a
showing of fundamental error.

Anderson argues that his possession of the

methamphetamine in the baggie and the methamphetamine residue on the paraphernalia
were “temporally discrete” because he “consumed the methamphetamine before the traffic
stop” while the “residue was in [his] car at the time of the traffic stop.” (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 30-31.) This argument is disingenuous. Eating the baggie of methamphetamine did
not divest Anderson of possession, it merely, at least for a time, meant the
methamphetamine had changed containers. Likewise, the methamphetamine residue did
not spontaneously generate in Anderson’s car the moment he stopped. Anderson had the
methamphetamine in the baggie and in the residue in one continuous act of possession from
before the officers attempted the traffic stop until the officers took possession of the
methamphetamine by opening the safe and picking up the baggie on the jail floor. This is
not a situation where the defendant possessed methamphetamine, used it to get high, then
obtained more methamphetamine. Anderson’s argument that he engaged in separate
unions of possessory acts with intent defies logic and invites a misapplication of the law.
Anderson further argues that the methamphetamine baggie and methamphetamine
residue were “necessarily in different locations, respectively, [his] person and the safe.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 31.) This argument, that evidence the methamphetamine was in
different containers shows separate acts of possession, is meritless. Southwick, 158 Idaho
at 181-82, 345 P.3d at 240-41.
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Anderson also argues he had a different “intent” related to eating the
methamphetamine than he did in relation to the residue, which he did not eat. (Id.) This
argument is irrelevant. The question is whether there were “separate incidents involving
distinct unions of mens rea and actus reas [sic]” related to the methamphetamine in the
baggie and the methamphetamine residue. Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 475, 272 P.3d at 447.
He committed the same act of possession with the same intent (intent to possess or control
methamphetamine) in relation to both the baggie and the residue. The act of eating the
evidence to avoid its discovery is an entirely different union of criminal act and criminal
intent. See I.C. § 18-2603 (destruction of evidence). That his attempt to eat the baggie of
methamphetamine was motivated by a desire to avoid being caught with it has no relevance
to whether he committed different acts of possession with separate mental states.
Anderson was charged with a single count of possession of methamphetamine for
a single crime of possession of methamphetamine. The state could not have charged
Anderson with two (or more) crimes of possession of methamphetamine under the facts of
this case. Because Anderson was not double charged for two crimes in a single count, he
was not entitled to a special unanimity instruction. Anderson has failed to show error,
much less clear, constitutional error.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Anderson’s convictions for
possession of methamphetamine and possession of paraphernalia.
DATED this 10th day of August, 2018.
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